DRAM is the most prevalent memory technology used in laptops, mobile phones, workstations and servers. As such, its security is paramount, yet DRAM attacks remain as viable as ever despite many attempts to resolve its security problems. The toolkit of DRAM disturb attacks has expanded with the introduction of new techniques such as Half-Double and RowPress, and it is likely that additional form of disturbance errors (and reliability and security issues) will emerge as we scale DRAM devices to smaller feature sizes. DRAM is also plagued by additional forms of attack, including side-channel, Denial-of-Service (DoS), and cold-boot attacks.
Against this backdrop, the industry is introducing new DRAM security solutions that require independent scrutiny from the academia. Academia continues to propose novel fixes for RowHammer, often without the benefit of insight into constraints faced by the industry.
Time JST (21st) | Time CEST (21st) | Topic |
09:00 - 11:00 | 02:00 - 04:00 | Session I |
11:00 - 11:30 | 04:00 - 04:30 | Coffee Break |
11:30 - 13:00 | 04:30 - 06:00 | Session II |
13:00 - 14:00 | 06:00 - 04:00 | Lunch Break |
Softhammer: Exploiting Rowhammer Bit Flips without Crashing
Finn de Ridder, Patrick Jattke, Kaveh Razavi
Rubber Mallet: A Study of High Frequency Localized Bit Flips and Their Impact on Security
Andrew J. Adiletta, Zane Weissman, Fatemeh Khojasteh Dana, Berk Sunar, Shahin Tajik
CnC-PRAC: Coalesce, not Cache, Per Row Activation Counts for an Efficient in-DRAM Rowhammer Mitigation
Chris S. Lin, Jeonghyun Woo, Prashant J. Nair, Gururaj Saileshwar
A Simulation-based Evaluation Framework for Inter-VM RowHammer Mitigation Techniques
Hidemasa Kawasaki, Soramichi Akiyama
Sudoku: Decomposing DRAM Address Mapping into Component Functions
Minbok Wi, Seungmin Baek, Seonyong Park, Mattan Erez, Jung Ho Ahn
Counterpoint: One-Hot Counting for PRAC-Based RowHammer Mitigation
Shih-Lien Lu, Jeonghyun Woo, Prashant J. Nair
DRFM and the Art of Rowhammer Sampling
Salman Qazi, Moinuddin Qureshi